This paper analyzes a framework where policymakers decide how to spend public resources on physical capital and labor in order to produce two public goods. Candidate policymakers disagree about which goods to produce, and may alternate in o¢ ce due to elections. When capital and labor are complementary inputs to the production of public goods, the anticipation of political turnover reduces public savings in physical capital rather than …nancial assets. Political turnover renders the stock of physical capital for public production too low and ine¢ ciently combined with labor.
Introduction
How does disagreement between current and future governments in ‡uence policy outcomes? This issue is fundamental for understanding …scal policy in democracies and has motivated a large number of studies. Cornerstones in this literature, and in political economics at large, are the analyses of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) (TA, hereafter) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) . They argue that when current and future policymakers disagree about which public goods government should provide, policy will be biased toward excessively high public de…cits. Restricting …scal policy through balanced budget rules are thus in order. However, these analyses treat the government as a consumer who buys public goods at …xed prices.
In reality, on the other hand, governments produce many of the public goods they provide themselves.
1 Furthermore, such production generally requires inputs that di¤er by the ‡exibility with which they may be applied. This paper extends TA's model to account for these features. I assume that the production of public goods requires a combination of publicly owned capital that is slowly accumulated and purpose-speci…c, and labor which is freely determined at any point in time. I …nd that if physical capital and labor are complementary inputs to public production, expected political turnover will not generate a de…cit bias as in TA, but too low investment in physical capital instead.
These results are interesting from both a positive and a normative perspective. On the positive side, several papers have investigated TA's prediction that an incumbent will accumulate more debt when re-election is less likely, including Lambertini (2004 ), Franzese Jr. (2001 and Petterson-Lidbom (2001) . The general conclusion from these studies is a rejection of TA's hypothesis. My framework explains the absence of such a de…cit bias, without refuting the politico-economic mechanisms in the established literature. The intuitive reason is that by installing purpose-speci…c capital today, an incumbent in ‡uences the allocation of labor chosen by his successor. This ability to in ‡uence his successor's spending increases the incumbent's valuation of future public wealth. The more capital and labor complement each other, the stronger is this e¤ect. With an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor that is consistent with available empirical evidence, policymakers will not raise de…cits in anticipation of future electoral defeat.
When it comes to the accumulation of capital to be used in public production, I show that it is likely to be reduced by political instability. This holds because a current policymaker about to invest realizes that his successor will allocate labor in a di¤erent way than what he, the incumbent, prefers. He therefore anticipates that the capital he builds to produce his most preferred good will be under-utilized relative to the capital he accumulates for production of the other good. Hence, the return to physical capital is reduced by anticipated political turnover. This result may be of relevance for the discussion of why public investment in physical capital has fallen relative to GDP in most OECD countries since the 1970s (Heinemann (2006) , Roubini and Sachs (1989) ), and whether it has become too low (Aschauer (1989) ). 2 It is also consistent with the cross-country evidence in Darby, Li and Muscatelli (2004) that public investments in physical capital are low when political turnover is high.
3 Furthermore, while a massive amount of research has analyzed public debt and physical capital accumulation separately, this paper treats these two issues jointly.
It makes sense to analyze them together because …nancial assets and physical capital are two alternative means for storing public wealth, and one should therefore 2 Aschauer (1989) argued that public capital contributes strongly to economic growth and that it was undersupplied in the US. These results have since been subject to an intense debate, surveyed in Romp and de Haan (2007) . Importantly, this literature has focused only on parts of the public capital stock, especially infrastructures, whereas the focus of this paper is on public capital at large.
3 Darby et al. (2004) measure turnover as the share of seats added or lost by each party in government at the previous election. distinguish between aggregate public savings and the composition of public sav-
ings. An insight in my analysis is that the qualitative in ‡uence of political turnover on total savings, de…ned as the sum of bond and physical capital accumulation, is identical to what TA …nd in their model economy with only …nancial assets. However, political turnover in ‡uences the composition of public savings, as investment in physical capital is reduced relative to bond accumulation when policymakers expect to be replaced in the future. 4 On the normative side, the model predicts that political turnover leads to resource waist in government production. Ex post, governments allocate labor e¢ -ciently in the sense that production is on the production frontier given by existing physical capital and technology. However, the allocation of public resources will not generally be on the ex ante possibility frontier. If the identity of the decisionmaker changes, production of the good that the previous policymaker prefers more strongly than the current policymaker will be too capital intensive, while production of the good that the successor prefers more strongly will be too labor intensive.
Hence, more of both goods could have been produced at no expense by reallocating second period capital and labor.
Importantly, this ine¢ ciency is likely not to be in ‡uenced by a restriction on government's ability to accumulate debt. Hence, the conclusion in TA that disagreement over the provision of public goods motivates balanced budget rules does not generalize to an economy where these public goods are produced using predetermined and purpose-speci…c capital.
In addition to TA discussed above, several other studies analyze how strategic considerations in ‡uence policy choices when political agents disagree about which goods and services government should provide. Two studies are particularly closely related to this paper. Glazer (1989) shows how an incumbent may invest in durable public consumption so as to ensure that certain services are provided in the future when someone else is in charge. The framework I propose encompasses this as a special case where capital and labor are perfect substitutes in production. Peletier, Dur and Swank (1999) extend TA's analysis by granting governments the option to invest in an additional asset that yields purely …nancial returns. They show that while an optimal level of …nancial investments will be chosen if no restrictions on debt accumulation are in place, these investments will be too low if balanced budget requirements are present. Both these studies predict that policymakers accumulate more debt when re-election is less likely. A central contribution of my paper is to show how reasonable assumptions regarding the production technology of the public sector overturns the predictions regarding strategically motivated debt and capital accumulation in a political equilibrium, and potentially brings them closer to existing empirical evidence.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 describes its equilibrium. The main results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 conducts robustness analysis. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
The economy is populated by a large number of atomistic individuals who di¤er by their preferences over two public goods g and f . Individual i's preferences for 5 Two other analyses of how political considerations a¤ect public investment decisions are Besley and Coate (1998) and Azzimonti (2005) . These have in common that public capital is homogenous (and hence is not an object over which there is disagreement) and its role is to enhance private sector productivity and thereby future tax revenues. In their equilibria public investment is too low. Bassetto and Sargent (2006) analyze politically determined investment decisions in an overlapping generations model and show how imperfect altruism for the unborn generations leads to under-investment. Neither of these studies allow the political agents to disagree over di¤erent types of capital, or current investment to a¤ect the relative price of di¤erent public goods in the future. public goods in period t are given by
where is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between g and f within period t, and is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for public goods measured in "e¢ ciency units",
. The parameter i di¤ers across households.
There are two periods. Each period an elected government receives a given income, normalized to one, in order to provide the two public goods. In period t these goods must be produced with the production functions
where n h t and k h t are labor and capital used to produce good h, h = g; f , " > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and is the distribution parameter that determines the labor intensity of public production.
Both capital and labor are in in…nitely elastic supply at unit cost one. The amount of labor employed is freely chosen each period. Physical capital, on the other hand, is less ‡exible as it is chosen one period in advance and speci…c to the production of each public good.
In period one the government chooses
where is the depreciation rate of physical capital, which is identical in the two public production activities. In period two the government chooses n n g 2 ; n f 2 o only, subject to the budget constraint
where b is the amount borrowed in the …rst period. This asset is traded on the world market, which clears at a net interest rate of zero. Clearly, (4) builds on the assumption that debt is always honored, and it implies that b 2 [ 1; 1]. This budget constraint also implies that public capital is of no value in the second period, apart from its contribution to the production of public goods. Hence, capital is irreversible for the period 2 decision-maker. The initial capital stocks k g 1 and k f 1 are exogenously predetermined.
Representatives from either of two political parties, denoted D and R, can hold o¢ ce. Their preferences for public goods have the same form as voters', i.e.
equation (1), with preference weights D and R , for party D and R respectively. Party J's preferences for public goods over the two periods are given by
I restrict attention to cases where J 2 h0; 1i, and ignore the extreme cases J = f0; 1g.
A period is de…ned as a term of o¢ ce. Before period 2 there is an election, which party R wins with probability p R and party D wins with probability 1 p R . 6 This electoral uncertainty may be due to a random participation rate, for instance due to ‡uctuating costs of voting or changes in the eligibility of the voting population, as discussed in TA. Alternatively, the source of uncertainty may be random ‡uctuations in the parties'relative popularity along dimensions of politics that are independent of the composition of public goods. The period one government is of course also elected, but that election is unimportant for my analysis since I only study choices that are made later in time. 7 My structure with exogenous re-election probabilities can be rationalized within a proba-Compared to TA's framework, the crucial distinctions are that I allow for intratemporal non-separability between g and f in utility and that providing public goods requires labor and capital, where the latter is predetermined and hence enters the decision maker's problem as a state variable. Intratemporal separability is encompassed as the special case where = . 8 An environment where public income is converted into public goods at constant unit cost, as considered in TA, is encompassed as the special case where = 1. Clearly, the assumption that capital is completely predetermined while labor is fully ‡exible is strong, as certain types of capital may be easily sold and rented in the market while some workers have no alternative employers to the public sector. However, the mechanisms in this paper are of a general nature. They only rely on some inputs to public production being more ‡exible than others.
[ 1; 0], as in TA. These restrictions are
< 1 and
Further details are provided in the appendix.
The novelty of this framework relative to TA is that the labor choices depend on purpose-speci…c capital (k g 2 and k f 2 ):
The signs of these reactions are ambiguous. To gain insight, it is useful to consider them under the speci…c functional forms for utility and production technology displayed in equations (1) and (2). With these functional forms the denominators in (7) and (8) are negative, while the numerators may be written as
Hence, it follows that G J kg > 0 if and only if the elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent goods in the utility function ( ) is larger than the elasticity of substitution between the inputs of g-production ("), and vice versa. The intuition is that an extra unit of physical capital has two opposing e¤ects on labor demand in period two. On the one hand, an extra unit of k g 2 increases the marginal productivity of labor in the production of g 2 to the extent that the two input factors are complementary in production. All else equal this motivates the second period policymaker to allocate labor to the g-sector.
On the other hand, since the utility function is concave in any speci…c good, the increase in g-goods when k g 2 increases makes the marginal utility of g-goods fall.
This motivates moving labor from g-production to f -production. Hence, the use of labor in g-production increases with the amount of capital installed there if and only if the degree to which k g 2 substitutes for n g 2 in production (") is lower than the degree to which g 2 substitutes for f 2 in consumption ( ).
The above result holds somewhat more generally, as summarized in the following proposition:
is homogenous in g and f , and that
is homogenous of degree one in n h and k h with 0 < h n h 2 < 1 and 
subject to the production technology (2), the budget constraint (3) and the reaction functions (7) and (8). Thus, the …rst period decisionmaker acknowledges how his investment choices will in ‡uence second period outcomes. A solution to this problem must satisfy
in addition to the budget constraint (3). These are the …rst-order conditions for labor use, debt accumulation, investment in the g-sector and investment in the f -sector, respectively.
Solution of the Model and Parametrization
The model cannot be solved analytically, except under certain speci…c parametrizations of the production and utility functions. For instance, when " = = = 1, policymakers do not respond to variation in their re-election probability. 9 To obtain more general results I numerically solve the set of equations composed by the …rst-order conditions and budget constraints. This will allow us to study the political equilibrium under an empirically plausible set of parameter values, and to vary these parameters in order to understand the important mechanisms at work.
The benchmark set of parameter values is given in Table 1 . They are motivated by the following considerations.
One period in the model is to be interpreted a term of o¢ ce, which typically is around 4 years. Hence, the value assigned to is consistent with a yearly depreciation rate slightly below 5 percent, which is within the range that Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) and Kamps (2004) argue is empirically reasonable for public capital. 10 To quantify the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, ", I lean on estimates of macroeconomic production functions. Two recent examples using U.S. time series are Klump, McAdam and Willman (2007) , who estimate the elasticity of substitution to be between 0:5 and 0:6, and Antràs (2004), who concludes more generally that the elasticity is "likely to be considerably less than one". A priori there is no reason believe that capital-labor substitutability is very di¤erent in the public sector. I therefore set " to 0:7.
The value assigned to the distribution parameter is based on the evidence for US government expenditure in Cavallo ( Furthermore, in order to solve the model initial capital stocks
The mapping between data and is complicated by the fact that cost minimization is inconsistent with the theoretical foundation of this paper where investment and employment choices are a¤ected by strategic considerations. In addition to the measurement problem that public sector output is not observed, this implies that a public production function cannot be estimated in the same way as macro production functions conventionally are (f.ex. in Arrow, Chenery and Solow (1961) and Klump et al. (2007) ).
speci…ed. In the main analysis I will set these initial capital stocks at the levels that the incumbent would choose to maintain if he were certain to hold o¢ ce also in the second period. Hence,
Analytical expressions for the equilibrium objects in this case are given in the appendix. In a robustness analysis I will show that the results of the paper are not driven by these initial conditions.
Results

Debt Accumulation
As a benchmark for comparison, it is useful to start with the main result of TA.
They assume that utility is separable in g and f , and show that if the "concavity
of the utility function is decreasing, an incumbent issues more government debt (b) when he expects to be replaced by someone with a di¤erent preference weight in the second period. 12 With the CES utility function in (1) preferences are separable when = , and the condition that 0 (h) < 0 is satis…ed when > 1. Hence, the incumbent borrows (b > 0) if > 1, and saves (b < 0) if < 1. If = 1, the budget is balanced. The intuition behind this condition is as follows. When the incumbent realizes that the future basket of public goods will diverge from his own preferred composition, two e¤ects shape his choice of debt accumulation. On the one hand, his subjective valuation of future public wealth is reduced by the fact that it will be spent in what the incumbent views as a sub-optimal way. This motivates him to run a de…cit, so as to …nance a higher provision of the consumption basket he prefers. On the other hand, if preferences are concave in consumption, the incumbent would like to derive the same level of utility from public goods consumption in both periods. When he realizes that the future basket of public goods is going to be sub-optimally 12 The concavity index is discussed in Debreu and Koopmans (1982) composed, the only way to achieve such a smoothing is to increase the wealth available for future spending, i.e. to save. With the CES utility function (1), the …rst of these e¤ects dominates when > 1, in which case the o¢ ce holder in period one favors a de…cit.
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Figure 1 plots the de…cit chosen by an incumbent from party R who is certain to be re-elected (p R = 1), minus the de…cit he chooses when he is certain to be replaced by a candidate from party D (p R = 0). The magnitudes can be interpreted as share of government income per period. The solid line is computed with = 1, which implies that public goods are produced using labor only under constant returns to scale. Hence government essentially acts like a price-taking consumer, as in TA. We see that the relationship between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and excess debt accumulation implied by their study also holds with a non-separable utility function.
The dotted curve in Figure 1 plots the de…cit bias when the government must combine labor with capital using a Cobb-Douglas technology (" = 1) with = 0:7 to produce public goods. 14 We see that introducing purpose-speci…c capital in this way rotates the de…cit curve around the point of zero debt and brings it everywhere closer to zero. Hence, purpose-speci…c capital together with CobbDouglas production technology reduces the response of …nancial savings to political instability. Under the speci…c value of used in the …gure, the impact of political turnover on …nancial savings is roughly halved.
Behind this e¤ect lies the following mechanism. Because " = 1, capital and labor complement each other. Hence, the assumption that the current capital stock is …xed implies decreasing returns to labor in period one, so that the marginal cost of raising current production, in terms of future production foregone, is increasing.
This e¤ect dampens the incentive that arises when > 1 to shift resources from the future to the present . Furthermore, when the incumbent shifts resources to the present period, he will do this not only by accumulating more debt, which implies less use of labor in period two, but also by accumulating less physical capital since the two inputs are complementary. Hence, the excess debt accumulation that arises when > 1 is reduced. Conversely, when < 1 what is now a de…cit bias in TA is mitigated, as decreasing returns to labor increases the incentive to smooth labor expenditure, and because the incumbent increases savings in physical as well as …nancial capital.
While the Cobb-Douglas production function provides a useful starting point, it seems empirically more relevant with an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor that is substantially lower, as discussed above. Figure 1 therefore includes a …nal curve which shows the strategically induced de…cit bias when " = 0:7.
We see that debt accumulation is now close to zero even when is relatively large.
In part, this is due to the mechanism explained for the Cobb-Douglas case, since a higher complementarity between capital and labor dampens the returns to excessive …rst-period employment and motivates an incumbent to cut savings not only in …nancial capital, but in physical capital as well. However, we also see that the incumbent always chooses lower …nancial savings now than with a Cobb-Douglas technology. The reason is a composition e¤ect in public savings. As consequence of Proposition 1, strong complementarity between capital and labor enables the incumbent to use the investment composition in period one to in ‡uence the labor allocation in period two. This increases the incumbent's valuation of future …nancial wealth. In addition, complementarity implies that the future return to physical capital depends on the labor it is combined with. As explained further in the next section, this tends to reduce the incumbent's valuation of physical capital.
Hence, the expectation of political turnover tilts the composition of public saving toward …nancial capital when " = 0:7. Figure 2 plots the di¤erence between investment in physical capital when the incumbent is sure to be re-elected and investment in physical capital when he is sure not to be re-elected. 15 The dotted curve shows that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, political turnover increases investment in physical capital when < 1, but reduces it when > 1. This is similar to the de…cit bias in Figure 1 above. Hence it is clear that with " = 1, the incumbent responds to anticipated turnover by saving more in both physical and …nancial assets if < 1, while he cuts savings in both asset types if > 1.
Physical Capital Accumulation
However, this result does not hold when " di¤ers from unity. From the lower curve we see that with " = 0:7, expected turnover tends to reduce accumulation of physical capital, and more so the higher is voters'willingness to substitute public consumption between periods and between the two goods. Comparing Figure 2 to Figure 1 gives the following insight: When capital and labor are complements in public production, political turnover tends to motivate under-accumulation of physical capital rather than …nancial assets.
The intuition behind this shift away from physical capital is as follows. When capital and labor complement each other, the future return to capital depends on the amount of labor it is combined with. Since the successor has di¤erent preferences over public goods than the incumbent, he will tend to allocate relatively more labor to production of the good the incumbent prefers relatively weakly (g in the numerical example) and less to the good the incumbent prefers more 15 Because the initial capital stocks, k g 1 and k f 1 , are identical in the two cases, the curves in Figure 2 show the di¤erence between the second period capital stock, k g 2 +k f 2 , under certain turnover and certain re-election. Since government revenues are set to 1 each period, the magnitudes along the vertical axis represent the share of total government revenues. strongly (f ). Hence, from the incumbent's perspective the capital he builds will be ine¢ ciently combined with labor in the future. As consequence, the incumbent's valuation of physical capital available for future public production is reduced by expected turnover when " is small. Since the opposite holds for …nancial assets, as discussed in last section, it follows that expected turnover tilts the composition of public savings away from physical capital and toward …nancial assets.
Total Public Savings
Because physical capital and bonds are two alternative means for storing public wealth, a relevant question is how political turnover in ‡uences total public savings, de…ned as accumulation of both two asset types summed together. Figure 3 plots the di¤erence between total savings under certain re-election and under expected political turnover, as a function of . We see that political turnover reduces total savings when > 1 while it increases savings when < 1.
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This is exactly as in the TA-economy, where the only means of storage is bonds, displayed by the solid line for comparison. The intuition is also the same: When < 1, the incumbent cares strongly about smoothing his utility ‡ow from public goods and therefore he saves more the less e¢ ciently he expects public wealth (whether in physical capital or …nancial assets) to be spent in the future. When > 1, his major concern is to ensure that public resources are spent when they yield the highest returns, and hence he saves less the weaker he expects future spending to align with his own preferences.
We also see from Figure 3 that the extent to which capital and labor complement each other in ‡uences the bias in total savings quantitatively. Higher complementarity (i.e. lower ") makes total savings respond less to political turnover. Figure 3 displays only the cases where " = 0:7 and " = 1, the conclusion that total savings is biased downward if > 1 and upward if < 1 holds for any value of ".
17 Though not evident in Figure 3 , the bias in total savings in the production economy approaches that in the TA-model as " grows large. This will be evident in the sensitivity analysis below.
This follows from the fact that for given capital stocks, the marginal return to labor expenditure is more strongly decreasing the lower " is. As explained when analyzing the de…cit bias above, this implies that shifting resources intertemporally becomes more costly in terms of public goods foregone.
The Costs of Political Turnover
When government production is homogenous of degree one, as with the speci…c production functions in (2), the highest level of public production attainable at a given cost is achieved for a unique capital-labor ratio = allocates resources to achieve ex post e¢ ciency, from an ex ante perspective the allocation may be ine¢ cient. The following proposition states that if the o¢ ce holder in period 2 has di¤erent preferences than the o¢ ce holder in period 1, ex ante ine¢ ciency will indeed result:
Assume that the o¢ ce holder in period 1 is of type R. Then
. Hence, second-period production is not on the ex ante production possibility if there is
with the speci…c production function in (2).
political turnover.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition re ‡ects that when there is turnover, the second-period policymaker allocates too much labor to production of the good he prefers more strongly than his predecessor (good g if a D > R ), and too little labor to the other purpose. With a di¤erent combination of the inputs into second period production more could have been produced of either good. I will later refer to this source of resource waste as "ine¢ cient allocation of inputs". Note that this ine¢ ciency is not driven by uncertainty about the election outcome, as it arises also when p R = 0 and the incumbent thus has the information that enables him to invest in a way that supports e¢ ciency in period 2. It is driven by the incumbent's motive to invest so as to push the composition of government production in the second period toward his own preferences rather than onto the ex ante possibility frontier.
There is a further cause of production ine¢ ciency in this economy. This is the …rst-period decision-maker's choice of how much to save in physical relative to …nancial capital. As seen from the preceding analysis, the composition of savings is likely to be a¤ected by anticipated political turnover. Hence, the total capitallabor ratio in the second period,
, will generally deviate from its …rst best level . I refer to this as "ine¢ cient composition of savings".
The upper panel of Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the two ine¢ ciency sources in the political equilibrium when p R = 0. It shows how many more f -goods that could have been produced in the second period if public resources were used more e¢ ciently than in the political equilibrium, without reducing g 1 , f 1 or g 2 . The dashed line isolates the e¤ect of the ine¢ cient allocation of inputs. Hence it is computed holding savings in bonds ( b) and capital (k f 2 + k g 2 ) at their political equilibrium levels, while capital and labor types are allocated so as to minimize the costs of producing g 2 . The solid line shows how many more f -goods that would have been produced if the composition of savings were optimal as well. Thus, the distance between the dashed and solid line isolates the contribution of the suboptimal savings composition to production ine¢ ciency. 19 We see that a substantial portion of public goods may be lost due to a bad resource allocation in the political equilibrium. Furthermore, it is the ine¢ cient allocation of inputs that contributes most to overall ine¢ ciency, while the in ‡uence of the savings composition is negligible.
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The bottom panel in Figure 4 distinguishes between production ine¢ ciency in the political equilibrium and in the situation where the incumbent behaves as if he were sure to decide both periods, but is replaced by someone else in the second period. The former is referred to as a "strategic politician" while the latter is referred to as a "naive planner" in the …gure. We see that the two curves in the …gure nearly coincide. Hence, whether the incumbent behaves strategically or naively is almost irrelevant.
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The small di¤erence between the two ine¢ ciency measures re ‡ects two e¤ects that almost completely cancel each other out in the political equilibrium. On the one hand, the incumbent who is aware of his successor's preferences may use this information by investing so as to support e¢ ciency in period two production.
On the other hand, the strategic politician has an incentive to invest so as to push the composition of second period production toward his own preferences. Figure 4 shows that the potential gain from the incumbent's knowledge about the successor's preferences is essentially eliminated by the strategic behavior.
19 Details on these calculations are in the appendix. 20 As is clear from Figures 1 and 2 , the quantitative importance of ine¢ ciently composed public savings will depend on . However, the conclusion that the bad composition of input expenditures is more severe than the bad composition of savings is robust to variations in . Sensitivity results are available upon request. 21 This …nding is robust to alternative parametrizations of the model.
Sensitivity Analysis
The Elasticity of Substitution Between Capital and Labor
A key insight from the above analysis is that the technology by which government produces public goods is decisive for how anticipated turnover in ‡uences public savings. This section therefore explores how the strategically induced biases to debt and physical capital accumulation, as well as total savings, vary with ", the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Table 1 . We see that the relationship between "
and the de…cit bias is non-monotonic, and that expected political turnover does not a¤ect public savings when " = 0 or when " is large, in addition to the previously discussed case where " = = 1. 22 Since = 1, we know from the last section that total savings will be una¤ected by political turnover, and hence that the bias in physical capital accumulation will mirror the de…cit bias, which also is clear from the solid curves in Figure 6 . We may therefore conclude that when capital and labor complement each other relatively strongly (" < 1 in the …gure), expected turnover tilts the composition of savings toward …nancial assets and away from physical capital, while the opposite occurs when capital and labor are relatively close substitutes (" > 1). The intuition behind the curve in Figure 5 is as follows.
With a "Leontief" production function (" = 0), a policymaker's choice of how to allocate labor is fully determined by the composition of capital that he faces.
Hence, an incumbent's investment will perfectly pin down the allocation of labor in period 2, independently of who actually is in charge in that period. Debt and physical capital accumulation are therefore una¤ected by political turnover when
Increasing " has countervailing e¤ects. On the one hand, a higher degree of substitutability loosens the link between the capital and labor composition, and allows the successor to allocate more labor to the purpose he prefers relatively strongly. From the incumbent's perspective this implies that physical capital will be sub-optimally combined with labor in period 2, and hence his subjective valuation of physical capital relative to …nancial assets falls as " increases. This e¤ect underlies the negative slope of the de…cit bias for small values of " (below 0:35) in Figure 5 .
On the other hand, a higher value of " makes capital returns less sensitive to the allocation of labor. Hence, the larger is ", the less does a given mismatch between the composition of capital and labor reduce the value of physical capital.
Furthermore, because higher substitutability between capital and labor reduces an incumbent's in ‡uence on the future labor allocation, his valuation of …nancial assets is falling in ". Both these two last e¤ects make the value of physical capital rise relative to the value of …nancial assets as " increases, and together they underlie the increasing relationship between the de…cit bias and " in Figure 5 . When " > 1, they turn the strategically induced biases to debt and physical capital accumulation positive.
In the extreme case where capital and labor are perfect substitutes (" = 1), the production functions are linear with
Hence an incumbent may in this case e¤ectively pin down the composition of second period production by de…cit …nancing investment in physical capital. However, when > 0:5, pursuing this strategy is costly since the marginal productivity of labor is always higher than the marginal productivity of capital while the two inputs cost the same. This explains why the de…cit bias reverts to zero as " grows large in Figure 5 : When = 0:7 it is too costly to use capital instead of labor to produce public goods, hence capital is never used and equilibrium choices under high input substitutability are the same as they would be if the only input in public production was labor. 23 When = 1 these choices entail a zero de…cit bias, as displayed in Figure 1 . Figure 6 shows how public savings vary with " under three di¤erent values of
. We see that the qualitative e¤ect of " does not depend on . When " = 0, political turnover does not in ‡uence the incumbent's choices. When " is large, physical capital is never accumulated and the de…cit is determined by alone, as in TA. The lower curve con…rms the insight from the section above that the total savings bias, de…ned as the di¤erence between overinvestment in physical capital and the de…cit bias, is qualitatively determined by , whereas a low value of " dampens it.
The Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution
In the analysis so far I have focused on the e¤ect of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution because this is the parameter that determines the qualitative e¤ect of political turnover on public savings without public capital (as in TA and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) ). In order to explore the impact of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution on the results, Figure 7 displays the impact of turnover on public de…cits, physical capital accumulation and total savings as varies. Apart from , for which 3 values are considered, all other parameters are held at their benchmark values in Table 1 .
The central insight from Figure 7 is that the intratemporal elasticity matters mainly quantitatively for how anticipated turnover in ‡uences public saving. When approaches zero, the composition of public goods provided by the successor becomes independent of the incumbents' decisions. Hence the best an incumbent can do is to facilitate e¢ cient production in the future, and invest as much as if 23 Beetsma and van der Ploeg (2007) and Glazer (1989) argue that expected turnover yields excess investment. My model reveals that a key assumption for this result is that the return to public capital is independent of policy and that the costs of overinvestment are not too large. In this sense my model encompasses their analyses as the special case where capital and labor are close substitutes and is small (close to 0:5).
re-election were certain. When approaches in…nity, the successor's composition of public goods becomes extremely sensitive to the incumbent's decisions (as follows from Proposition 1), and hence the incumbent has large control over future resource use even if he is not re-elected. Thus, in the polar cases with extremely low or extremely high substitutability between g and f , the biases induced by turnover are negligible. When is in an intermediate range, the aforementioned e¤ects of political turnover on the composition of savings occur, as the accumulation physical capital relative to …nancial assets is reduced. The qualitative e¤ect of anticipated turnover on total public savings is always determined by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( ), while the intratemporal substitutability determines how quantitatively important any such bias will be.
Initial Capital Stocks
All results above were obtained under the assumption that the initial capital stocks k g 1 and k f 1 were such that a planner would choose zero net investments in physical capital. Because this assumption was chosen solely for analytical convenience, Figure 8 shows the e¤ects of relaxing it.
The two upper plots let the fraction
vary from half to twice its value in the benchmark, holding the total amount of initial capital (k g 1 + k f 1 ) constant. We see that the strategically induced debt and investment biases both are una¤ected by the initial composition of the capital stock. The two lower panels in Figure   8 hold the composition
constant at the same level as in the benchmark, but instead let the total amount of capital vary from half to twice the level assumed before. Again the main results for excess debt and capital accumulation are robust, although there is a small tendency for the two biases to grow slightly as the total amount of physical capital increases. 
Polarization and the Re-election Probability
Central insights from TA and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) are that greater polarization and lower re-election probability both increase the strategically induced bias in public de…cits. Not surprisingly, similar conclusions hold in the setting with physical capital studied in this paper. A higher degree of polarization, de…ned as j R D j, monotonically increases the e¤ect of turnover on debt and physical capital accumulation. A lower re-election probability, p R , does the same. These e¤ects of j R D j and p R are purely quantitative.
Conclusion
Established theories in political economics claim that political turnover will generate a de…cit bias in …scal policy. This paper has shown how the presence of purpose-speci…c public capital is likely to mitigate and even remove this de…cit bias, as the anticipation of turnover reduces saving in physical capital rather than in …nancial assets. The assumption behind this result is that in order to produce public goods, government must purchase capital which is complementary to labor in production.
A normative implication of my analysis is that political turnover makes government production less cost e¢ cient. The potential welfare gains from knowledge about changing government preferences are dissipated in strategic behavior by the incumbent who is about to be replaced. In order to mitigate such ine¢ ciencies due to strategic behavior, balanced budget rules are not likely help. What is required is instead institutions that make policymakers apply resources where the preconditions for public activity are good, even though these activities need no be what the current policymaker has strong preferences for. This would raise the returns to capital and thereby stimulate public investment.
The analysis motivates empirical exploration along several dimensions. In par-ticular, a testable prediction from the model is that public investment drops when politicians view re-election as less likely. It is natural to explore this prediction similarly to what Petterson-Lidbom (2001) and Lambertini (2004) do for public debt. Second, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the public production function determines the model's qualitative predictions for strategically induced debt and capital accumulation. Estimates of this parameter would therefore be valuable.
More generally, the analysis raises several interesting questions. When voting is endogenous, how will policymakers invest so as to maintain power? When during an election period should we expect high investment? Which institutions will bring public production towards its e¢ ciency frontier? These questions call for further research on models with government production. 
where u g j Assume that the utility and production functions are such that the following conditions always hold:
Condition 2: 0 < h n < 1 and 1 < h nn 0, for h = g; f .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify notation, this section ignores the preference and party indexes J and J. G kg may then be written as
where z (g; f )
g.
Note …rst that when g (n; k) is homogenous of degree 1, its elasticity of substitution (n; k) equals Sydsaeter, Strøm and Berck (2005) ). For z (g; f ), the following applies:
where (g; f ) is the elasticity of substitution between g and f in u(g; f ).
Sydsaeter et al. (2005)). The term z (g; f ) in (16) may be written as
The following shows that the numerator of z (g; f ), denoted P , equals the denominator of (g; f ). By adding and subtracting f gu 00 f f u 0 g 2 we may rewrite P as
is homogenous of degree k, then u gg g = (k 1) u g u gf f . Inserting this inside the brackets of the expression above and rearranging gives:
which is identical to the denominator in (g; f ). Thus, z (g; f ) = 1= (g; f ).
Hence, if u (g; f ) is homogenous of degree k and the production functions are homogenous of degree 1, we can express the reaction G kg as
Under Condition 2 this expression implies that G kg R 0 if (g; f ) R (n; k) as stated in the proposition. The same argument holds for F k f .
A.3 Planner Problem
De…ne a planner as an agent with preference weight who holds o¢ ce in both periods with certainty. Hence, the planner problem is to maximize
subject to (3) and (4). The …rst-order conditions are
. Furthermore, when the production functions are identical and homogenous of degree one,
A.3.1 Planner Solution with Speci…c Functional Forms and k
With the speci…c utility and production functions in (1) and (2), and under the assumption k h 2 = k h 1 for h = g; f , the …rst-order conditions (17) - (21) and the resource constraint (4) may be solved for the choice variables as follows
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The …rst-order conditions (10), (11) and (6) imply:
is given by:
Combining equation (25) with (26) and rearranging terms yields the following expression:
where
and
Assume that the utility and production functions satisfy Conditions 1 and 2.
It then follows that M > 0. Furthermore, because u g > 0 and u f < 0, the term
Assume that Conditions 1 and 2
hold, and that g n
Finally, in order to conclude we also need the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If g nk > 0 and Conditions 1 and 2 hold, then
Proof. Under Conditions 1 and 2 G
Thus, the inequality holds since g nk 0 and g nn < 0.
Consider the situation with p R = 1. It follows directly from (27) that
Consider the situation with R < D and 0 < p R < 1. If
< 1 as well, and hence equation (27) 
> 1, (27) holds with
. Hence, when R < D and
Consider the situation with R > D and 0 < p R < 1. If
> 1 as well, and hence equation (27) 
< 1, (27) holds with
Consider the situation with p R = 0. Equation (27) then implies that
In the same way it may be shown that
A.5 Two Measures of Ine¢ ciency
This section shows how the ine¢ ciency measures in Figure 4 are calculated.
The …rst measure, termed "Ine¢ cient allocation of inputs", is calculated by maximizing the production of f 2 with respect to n n Figure 1: The public de…cit under certain political turnover (p R = 0) minus the de…cit when the policymaker stays in o¢ ce with certainty (p R = 1). The solid line displays the case when public goods are produced using labor only ( = 1), which is equivalent to government being a consumer as in TA. The two other curves display cases where government uses capital to produce public goods ( = 0:7) for di¤erent values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, ". 
